SYMPOSIUM: PANDEMICS AND THE CONSTITUTION
TIERED SCRUTINY IN A PANDEMIC
Jeffrey D. Jackson*
During this spring of COVID-19, Americans are facing numerous
state and local government-imposed restrictions that would have seemed
implausible a few short months ago. While many of these restrictions
seem to be unquestionably warranted, there have been others that have the
potential to negatively impact fundamental rights. From abortion
restrictions to gun control, these actions threaten liberty in the name of
police powers.
During this time of crisis, there is a need for courts to be especially
vigilant. Throughout the nation’s history, the concept of emergency power
has been used to justify restrictions on the rights of Americans, with tragic
results. 1
Some of the problem has been confusion over what governmental
emergency powers are in times of crisis and how governmental actions
taken to meet emergencies should be scrutinized by courts. Erroneous
readings of early Supreme Court cases have led at least one circuit court
to conclude that “when faced with a society-threatening epidemic, a state
may implement emergency measures that curtail constitutional rights so
long as the measures have at least some ‘real or substantial relation’ to the
public health crisis and are not ‘beyond all question, a plain, palpable
invasion of rights secured by the fundamental law.’” 2
However, this purported standard is incorrect. The Constitution does
not change with the onset of an emergency, and neither do its levels of
scrutiny. While an emergency can provide justifications for governmental
conduct that would otherwise be unavailable, the underlying framework

* Professor of Law, Washburn University School of Law. Thanks to my colleague, Bill Rich, for his
advice and suggestions.
1. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
2. See In re Abbott, No. 20-50264, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 10893, at *16–17 (5th Cir. Apr.
20, 2020) (quoting Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 31 (1905)).
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remains intact. To believe otherwise takes the controlling precedent out
of context.
In order to protect rights, however, the framework must be
understood. This essay looks at the powers possessed by government
during times of emergency, and how those powers interact with
fundamental rights. Part I looks at the confusion surrounding the question
of whether the Constitution mandates a different test in times of epidemic,
and shows how the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence does not mandate a
more deferential standard for government action, but instead reaffirms
that traditional judicial scrutiny remains even in times of emergency. Part
II then looks at the constitutional questions raised by restrictions on
individual liberty that have been imposed during the COVID-19 epidemic,
and provides the framework for courts to evaluate them.
I. THE ROOT OF THE ISSUE: JACOBSON AND THE NEED FOR FURTHER
ANALYSIS
It is beyond dispute that states have broad police powers in times of
emergency that allow them to impose restrictions on the liberty of
individuals for the public good: the Supreme Court said as much in the
seminal case concerning governmental power to combat epidemics,
Jacobson v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts. 3 In Jacobson, the issue
was the power of Massachusetts to enact a statute requiring mandatory
smallpox vaccinations for all adults whenever “necessary for the public
health or safety.” 4 Any person refusing to comply would be fined five
dollars. 5 In discussing the power of the State to pass such legislation, the
Court stated, “[I]n every well-ordered society charged with the duty of
conserving the safety of its members the rights of the individual in respect
of his liberty may at times, under the pressure of great dangers, be
subjected to such restraint, to be enforced by reasonable regulations, as
the safety of the general public may demand.” 6 The Court recognized,
however, that not all laws purportedly passed for the safety of the public
were actually valid, stating:
If there is any such power in the judiciary to review legislative action in
respect of a matter affecting the general welfare, it can only be when that
which the legislature has done comes within the rule that, if a statute
purporting to have been enacted to protect the public health, the public

3.
4.
5.
6.

197 U.S. 11 (1905).
Id. at syllabus (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 75, § 137).
Id.
Id. at 29.
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morals, or the public safety, has no real or substantial relation to those
objects, or is, beyond all question, a plain, palpable invasion of rights
secured by the fundamental law, it is the duty of the courts to so adjudge,
and thereby give effect to the Constitution. 7

Under this standard, the Court found the Massachusetts law in question to
be valid. 8 However, the Court noted:
Before closing this opinion we deem it appropriate, in order to prevent
misapprehension as to our views, to observe—perhaps to repeat a
thought already sufficiently expressed, namely—that the police power
of a state, whether exercised directly by the legislature, or by a local
body acting under its authority, may be exerted in such circumstances,
or by regulations so arbitrary and oppressive in particular cases, as to
justify the interference of the courts to prevent wrong and oppression. 9

Of itself, Jacobson is unremarkable. The problem arises from courts
that use Jacobson as if it provides a different, more deferential framework
for the intrusion on fundamental rights than the normal scrutiny required
by the Constitution. 10 This is the mistake that the Fifth Circuit made in In
re Abbott. 11 There, the Fifth Circuit stated that, under Jacobson:
The bottom line is this: when faced with a society-threatening epidemic,
a state may implement emergency measures that curtail constitutional
rights so long as the measures have at least some “real or substantial
relation” to the public health crisis and are not “beyond all question, a
plain, palpable invasion of rights secured by the fundamental law.” 12

But to read Jacobson in this manner takes the standard used in that case
out of context, and ignores the last 70 or so years of Constitutional
jurisprudence relating to fundamental rights.
The Court in Jacobson was not setting out a special framework for
reviewing laws concerning emergency health regulations. Rather, the test
set out in Jacobson was the exact same test the Court used at the time for
reviewing every claim of due process and equal protection: the “classical
rational basis test.” 13 At the time, there was no neat distinction between
7. Id. at 31.
8. Id. at 39.
9. Id. at 38.
10. See e.g., In re Abbott, No. 20-50264, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 10893, at *16–17 (5th Cir.
Apr. 20, 2020).
11. See id., at 4 (stating that Jacobson provides “the framework governing emergency public
health measures”).
12. Id. at 16–17 (quoting Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 31 (1905).
13. See id. at 14–17; Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661–62 (1887); Atchison, Topeka, &
Santa Fe R.R. Co. v. Matthews, 174 U.S. 96 (1899). See also Jeffrey D. Jackson, Classical Rational
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what we now term “fundamental” rights and those that were not
fundamental. 14 Instead, the Court applied the same test to all rights, with
the test itself adjusting with the nature of the right that was purported to
be infringed. 15 Thus, the test used in a case like Mugler v. Kansas, which
concerned the power of the Kansas legislature to ban the manufacture and
sale of liquor for personal use, was the same as that used in all cases from
1887 to 1912:
If, therefore, a statute purporting to have been enacted to protect the
public health, the public morals, or the public safety, has no real and
substantial relation to those objects, or is a palpable invasion of rights
secured by the fundamental law, it is the duty of the courts to so adjudge,
and thereby give effect to the Constitution. 16

Even the case often held up as the epitome of judicial activism, Lochner
v. New York, was decided under this framework. 17
With this background, it becomes clear that Jacobson is not a case
establishing a framework for review, rather it is a case about how far the
police power of a state could extend. That is, could it go so far as to compel
a person to be vaccinated. The Court in Jacobson affirmed that it could;
that even such an intrusion could be justified if it passed the applicable
substantive due process test. 18
It was only after Jacobson that the Court’s substantive due process
and equal protection jurisprudence began to evolve in the direction that
would take it where it is today. Two months after Jacobson, Lochner
purported to use the same test, but introduced what became the first real
“fundamental right” formulation. The Lochner Court implicitly reversed
the presumption of constitutionality normally afforded state legislation,
instead finding a presumption in favor of “liberty of contract.” 19 The Court
made this presumption explicit for liberty of contract in cases such as

Basis and the Right to Be Free of Arbitrary Regulation, 14 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 493, 496–98
(2016) (examining the test for all rights used in the late 1800s and early 1900s).
14. See Jackson, supra note 13 at 496–98.
15. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1267, 1286–89
(2007) (describing this feature).
16. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. at 661. See also Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. at 31.
17. See 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905). The Lochner opinion cited Jacobson as the “latest” case to
discuss health regulations. Id. at 55–56.
18. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. at 27–30.
19. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 56 (1905); David E. Bernstein, The Story of
Lochner v. New York: Impediment to the Growth of the Regulatory State, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
STORIES 299, 318 (Michael C. Dorf ed., 2nd ed. 2009) (recognizing presumption in favor of liberty
of contract).
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Adkins v. Children’s Hospital 20 and Chas. Wolf Packing Co. v. Court of
Industrial Relations. 21 The Court also began applying the same standard
to other “fundamental” rights, such as the rights of parents to send their
children to religious schools. 22 While “liberty of contract” was soon to
disappear, the notion of fundamental rights continued. 23 Eventually, the
all-purpose classic rational basis test of Muller and Jacobson became the
tiered-scrutiny approach we know today. Legislation affecting a
fundamental right or a suspect class is examined under strict scrutiny;
legislation affecting various quasi-suspect classes or incidentally
burdening fundamental rights gets some sort of intermediate scrutiny, and
legislation that does not burden a fundamental right gets only a cursory
“modern” rational basis scrutiny. 24
Jacobson still remains good law for the propositions that state
governments have wide-ranging police powers to regulate health, safety,
and welfare, and that police powers can overcome even fundamental
rights given sufficient justification. 25 However, Jacobson does not set up
any kind of framework for determining whether the justification is
sufficient. That issue must be judged, not by the standards of 1905, but by
the current law.
II. TIERED SCRUTINY IN A PANDEMIC
The fact that Jacobson does not support a separate framework for
review of government actions in an emergency does not mean that an
emergency has no force. Rather, it means that the force is “baked in” to
the Constitutional tests themselves. The basic framework our system of
rights sets up is a balancing test between the necessity and importance of
20. 261 U.S. 525, 546 (1923).
21. 262 U.S. 522, 534 (1923).
22. See Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390, 399–403 (1923).
23. See David E. Bernstein, Lochner Era Revisionism Revised: Lochner and the Origins of
Fundamental Rights Constitutionalism, 92 GEO. L. J. 1, 53–58 (2003) (tracing the development of
fundamental rights after the demise of liberty of contract).
24. See, e.g. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719-23 (1997) (setting out tiered
scrutiny for substantive due process); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833 (1992) (establishing “undue burden” strict scrutiny for right to abortion); Ward v. Rock
Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989) (establishing intermediate scrutiny for content-neutral time,
place and manner restrictions); United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (establishing
intermediate scrutiny for neutral regulations incidentally affecting speech); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.
190 (1976) (establishing intermediate scrutiny for regulations discriminating on the basis of gender);
Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (establishing highly-deferential rational
basis test for nonfundamental rights).
25. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 356–57 (1997).
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governmental action and the degree of interference with rights. This
section looks at the way this balancing test plays out in some of the main
issue that have arisen during the COVID-19 crisis so far, such as: business
closures, including closures of firearms retailers; limits on gatherings,
including religious services; and the application of orders restricting
abortions.
A.

Business Closures in General

A prominent feature of state government’s response to COVID-19
has been the closure of nonessential businesses. 26 Subject to some
exemptions, most businesses in a state have been temporarily closed to
restrict the spread of the virus, severely impacting the lives and livelihood
of many Americans. 27 These temporary closures raise three main legal
questions: (1) do the orders themselves infringe on property rights in
violation of due process; (2) do exemptions for certain businesses but not
others violate equal protection; and (3) do the closures constitute a
regulatory taking that would entitle business owners to compensation?
In general, these types of closing orders are well within state police
powers. States have wide discretion in passing legislation relating to the
operation of businesses, and most economic regulation will not violate
due process. 28 Due process challenges to such orders, as with other
business regulations, fall under “modern” rational basis review. 29 This
standard of review is essentially toothless, requiring only that legislators
might have thought the law was rationally related to some legitimate state
interest, even if that interest was not the motivation for the law. 30 This test
essentially frees legislation from any type of meaningful review.
The same is true for equal protection challenges to state exemptions.
States have wide latitude in making decisions as to which businesses to
exempt or not exempt from closure orders. 31 In McGowan v. Maryland,
the Court held that, in determining whether exempting some businesses
but not others from a Sunday closing law constituted an arbitrary
classification, states were to be afforded:

26. See Erin Shumaker, Here are the states that have shutdown non-essential businesses, ABC
NEWS, (Apr. 3, 2020, 7:58 PM) https://abcnews.go.com/Health/states-shut-essential-businessesmap/story?id=69770806 [https://perma.cc/V64D-SQYD].
27. See id.
28. See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 533–39 (1934).
29. See Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 487–89 (1955).
30. See id. For a detailed discussion of why this is a terrible standard and should be abandoned,
see generally Jackson, supra note 13.
31. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425–26 (1961).
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a wide scope of discretion in enacting laws which affect some groups of
citizens differently than others. The constitutional safeguard is offended
only if the classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the
achievement of the State’s objective. State legislatures are presumed to
have acted within their constitutional power despite the fact that, in
practice, their laws result in some inequality. A statutory discrimination
will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to
justify it. 32

Thus, arguments that different state exemptions on the closure of business
violate equal protection are subject only to rational basis, and likely to
fail.
Finally, there is generally no entitlement to compensation under the
Fifth Amendment where a regulation temporarily closes a business. The
Court has held that a prohibition upon the use of property for purposes
that are declared, by valid legislation, to be injurious to the health the
community does not work a regulatory taking. 33 While it is true that even
valid legislation can sometimes become so onerous at to constitute a
regulatory taking, 34 it is unlikely that the temporary business closing
regulations such as the ones in place would do so. There is some authority
for the idea that extending a closing long beyond what is reasonably
necessary to serve the public interest could eventually constitute a
taking, 35 but in general, there is no Fifth Amendment takings issue with
closing regulations in general.
B.

The Special Case of Firearms Retailers

One flashpoint regarding state action during the COVID-19
pandemic concerns the closing of stores selling firearms. While a large
number of states have classified gun stores as essential businesses that can
remain open, some states initially refused to do so. 36 On March 28, the
Department of Homeland Security included “[w]orkers supporting the
32. Id.
33. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668–69 (1887); Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369
U.S. 590, 593–94 (1962). See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535
U.S. 302, 329 (2002) (reaffirming the rule).
34. See Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (holding that where a
regulation “goes too far” it will be held to constitute a taking).
35. See Tahoe Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S. at 342
(noting that the duration of a restriction must be considered in a regulatory claim).
36. See Adam Edelman, Buckling to pressure, many states deem gun stores ‘essential,’ allow
them to remain open during pandemic, NBC NEWS, (Apr. 7, 2020, 4:17 PM)
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/politics-news/buckling-pressure-many-states-deem-gun-storesessential-allow-them-n1177706 [https://perma.cc/Z9QK-2GX4].
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operation of firearm or ammunition product manufacturers, retailers,
importers, distributors, and shooting ranges” on its advisory list of
essential critical infrastructure workers. 37 Additionally, several lawsuits
have been filed alleging that closing firearms retailers would be a
violation of the Second Amendment.
Answering the question of whether such restrictions do violate the
Second Amendment is complicated by the fact that the Supreme Court has
provided very little guidance as to what the parameters of the Second
Amendment are. Although the Court held in District of Columbia v.
Heller 38 that the Second Amendment guarantees a personal right to
possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation, and in McDonald v.
City of Chicago 39 that this right extends against the states, it has said little
else. Heller holds that laws preventing the possession of handguns or long
rifles inside the home are unconstitutional, but that other laws, such as
prohibitions on the carrying of concealed weapons, or possession of
firearms by felons or the mentally ill, or the carrying of firearms in
“sensitive places” like schools or government buildings were presumably
constitutional. 40 The Court also noted that “laws imposing conditions and
qualifications on the commercial sale of arms” would be constitutional. 41
Beyond these examples, however, neither Heller nor McDonald offers
much guidance, and neither suggests the level of tiered scrutiny that the
Court would apply.
Circuit Courts of Appeal looking at the issue have generally applied
strict scrutiny to those regulations that burden the “core” of the Second
Amendment, such as the possession of weapons in the home. Those
Circuits have applied a lesser, “intermediate” form of scrutiny to
regulations that impose burdens outside the core, such as possession of

37. Christopher C. Krebs, Director, CYBERSECURITY AND INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY
AGENCY, Memorandum On Identification of Essential Critical Infrastructure Workers During
COVID-19
Response,
Apr.
17,
2020,
https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/
publications/Version_3.0_CISA_Guidance_on_Essential_Critical_Infrastructure_Workers_4.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2EJN-X3WT].
38. 554 U.S. 570, 592 (2008).
39. 561 U.S. 742, 749–50 (2010).
40. 554 U.S. at 626.
41. Id. at 627.
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assault weapons or extended magazines. 42 State courts have generally
followed this framework as well. 43
A temporary closing order on firearm retailers does not fit neatly into
the tiered scrutiny framework. On the one hand, the closing order does not
affect the right to possess or carry firearms for those persons who already
have them. On the other hand, the closing order may completely foreclose
the legal purchasing of firearms, albeit temporarily. Because under many
state laws the purchase of firearms must be conducted through a licensed
retailer, 44 a person does not have the option to purchase a firearm online
or through the mail. Some retailers that offer firearms may be deemed
essential and thus exempt from closure on a different basis, such as
Walmart. But such retailers may not be available in all states.45
An order closing all firearm retailers is quite different from the “laws
imposing conditions and restrictions on the commercial sale of arms” that
are presumptively constitutional under Heller. 46 Regulations such as
waiting periods or training requirements impose conditions on the Second
Amendment right that courts have held to be valid. 47 By contrast, the
effect of the law closing gun retailers is a total ban on the ability of all
residents to purchase, at least in those states where retail stores do not
otherwise sell firearms. Because the effect of the closing of gun stores in
places where firearms are not available through other outlets that remain
open for other reasons is that a person cannot legally purchase a firearm,
42. See Worman v. Healey, 922 F.3d 26, 37–38 (1st Cir. 2019); New York State Rifle & Pistol
Ass’n v. Cuomo, 804 F.3d 242, 254 (2nd Cir. 2015); United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89
(3d Cir. 2010); United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 680 (4th Cir. 2010; Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am.,
Inc. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives, 700 F.3d 185, 194 (5th Cir. 2012); United
States v. Greeno, 679 F.3d 510, 518 (6th Cir. 2012); Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 702–03
(7th Cir. 2011); United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1136 (9th Cir. 2013); United States v. Reese,
627 F.3d 792, 800–01 (10th Cir. 2010); GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 788
F.3d 1318, 1322 (11th Cir. 2015); Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244, 1252
(D.C. Cir. 2011).
43. See, e.g. Norman v. State, 215 So.3d 18, 36 (Fla. 2017); State v. DeCiccio, 105 A.3d 165,
205-06 (Conn. 2014;
44. See, e.g. 18 PA. CONS.STAT. § 6111(a)(2) (requiring a licensed dealer to perform a
background check in connection with the purchase of any firearm); 18 PA. CONS.STAT. § 6113(a)(1)
(business of firearms dealer may only be carried on at the premises designated in the license or a
licensed gun show).
45. See Asher Stocker, Walmart Shuts Down All Gun Sales in New Mexico After State Expands
(July
5,
2019,
12:21
PM),
Background
Check
Requirements,
NEWSWEEK
https://www.newsweek.com/walmart-new-mexico-gun-sales-1447768
[https://perma.cc/57WMUQKW].
46. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 627.
47. See Silvester v. Harris, 843 F.3d 816, 828 (9th Cir. 2016) (finding California’s 10-day
waiting period constitutional); Heller v. District of Columbia, 801 F.3d 264, 278-79 (D.C. Cir. 2015)
(mandatory one-hour training course required before possessing firearm held constitutional).
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this seems to be the kind of law that strikes at the “core” of the Second
Amendment, and thus warrants strict scrutiny.
Under the traditional strict scrutiny test, for a law to be valid the state
must show a “compelling governmental interest” and that the regulation
is “narrowly tailored” to advance that interest. 48 There is no serious
question that the state possesses a compelling governmental interest in
halting the spread of a pandemic. The problem comes in the “narrowly
tailored” part of the test. Under the strict scrutiny test for rights, the statute
must have a proper “fit” and not be over- or under-inclusive. Thus,
allowing exemptions to some stores that pose the same risk as others
might violate narrow tailoring. Of the states that do not provide an
exception for firearms retailers, New York and Massachusetts both have
deemed liquor stores to be “essential businesses.” 49 This poses a problem
for a “narrow tailoring” analysis in those states, given the similar profiles
and risk levels of firearms and liquor retailers.
There is a possibility that courts might choose to adopt a different
framework for firearms sales that is akin to that applied to laws under the
First Amendment for expressive conduct. Neutral laws of general
applicability that only incidentally restrict speech get some form of
intermediate scrutiny rather than strict scrutiny. 50 Despite what some
firearms advocates claim, 51 the business closure laws fit into the category
of neutral laws, in that they are not explicitly aimed at firearms retailers.
Passing something akin to O’Brien intermediate scrutiny would require
the regulation to have a substantial interest, be unrelated to the
suppression of the right in question, and pose a restriction on the right “no
greater than essential” to further the interest. 52 Again, this sort of test
would come down to the “tailoring” prong. Although the “no greater than

48. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997).
49. See Jessica Snouwaert, New York liquor stores are considered ‘essential’ businesses by the
state and will remain open during the coronavirus shutdowns, BUSINESS INSIDER (Mar. 20, 2020,
4:20 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/coronavirus-new-york-liquor-stores-deemed-essentialcan-stay-open-2020-3 [https://perma.cc/94GC-B9FX]; State of Massachusetts, COVID-19: Essential
Services, https://www.mass.gov/info-details/covid-19-essential-services [https://perma.cc/4BBRPYFT]. New Mexico, however, has not. Victoria Shupryt, Liquor stores to close, grocery stores must
limit customers as Governor extends emergency order, KOAT Action News (Apr. 7, 2020, 9:39 AM)
https://www.koat.com/article/gov-lujan-grisham-extends-emergency-order-until-end-ofapril/32058956# [https://perma.cc/QJN9-NZFJ].
50. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
51. See Nat’l Rifle Ass’n Instiute for Leg. Action, COVID-19: Threat to Second Amendment,
https://www.nraila.org/coronavirus (arguing that “anti-gun lawmakers are exploiting the COVID-19
pandemic to deny you and your loved ones your fundamental right to self-defense and your Second
Amendment rights”).
52. Id. at 376–77.
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essential” requirement is less than the “narrowly tailored” requirement for
strict scrutiny, it might be questionable in those states that have a long list
of businesses that are exempted.
Finally, there is a small chance that a court might adopt an exception
to the Second Amendment for neutral and generally applicable laws that
mirrors the controversial standard adopted for freedom of religion. 53
Under this standard, adopted in the late Justice Scalia’s opinion in
Employment Division v. Smith, a neutral and generally applicable law
would get only rational basis review. 54 Adopting such a test would mean
that a regulation would almost certainly be upheld. However, the adoption
of such a test is highly unlikely, given the rightful unpopularity of the
Smith test. 55
In sum, restrictions on the conducting of business of retail firearms
dealers invoke a Second Amendment analysis that is different from those
of other businesses. While that does not mean that such retailers are
automatically entitled to an exemption from closure, the restrictions do
require a different level of scrutiny that must be met. Further, states that
do not exempt gun retailers while exempting other businesses posing the
same degree of risk may run afoul of this scrutiny.
C.

Limits on Gatherings in General

Another issue arising during the response to COVID-19 is the
constitutionality of state limits on gatherings. A number of states have
passed restrictions on gathering of unrelated persons in groups of ten or
greater, and these restrictions raise questions regarding assembly and
associational rights.
First, it should be noted that there is no generalized right of social
association or assembly. 56 There are, however, rights of association and
assembly for the expression of First Amendment purposes. To the extent
that bans on gatherings of more than ten persons infringe on those types
of gatherings, they are subject to a higher level of constitutional scrutiny. 57
The applicable test is generally intermediate scrutiny in the context of
reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions. Such restrictions must (1)
be justified without reference to the content of speech; (2) be narrowly

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

See Employment Div., Dept. of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
See id. at 889–90,
See infra notes 60 to 62 and accompanying text (describing Smith).
See City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 24–25 (1989).
See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
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tailored to serve a significant governmental interest; and (3) leave open
ample alternative channels for communication of the information. 58
Under the circumstances, prohibitions on gatherings are contentneutral, as they do not depend upon the purpose and content of the
gathering as the basis for the restriction. The governmental interest
involved would almost certainly be classified as compelling, and, in the
absence of unusual exemptions, would probably be held to be narrowlytailored. Further, there are other channels for the communication of the
message, including multiple gatherings or the use of a different medium,
such as internet communications.
D.

Applying Limits on Gathering to Religious Services

The application of otherwise valid limits on the number of persons
in a gathering to religious services implicates an additional constitutional
safeguard: the First Amendment’s guarantee of free exercise of religion. 59
At the federal constitutional level, however, the Free Exercise Clause
provides little protection against state action in this regard. That is
because, as noted above, the late Justice Scalia’s opinion in Employment
Division v. Smith means that neutral laws of general applicability receive
only rational basis review. 60 This has the unusual effect of giving even
less protection against the effects of neutral laws in religious rights cases
than in other constitutional contexts, such as speech. 61
There is no doubt, moreover, that applying laws that are otherwise
applicable to the size of gatherings to gatherings for religious purposes is
neutral and generally applicable. Only when a law specifically targets
religious exercise for unfavorable treatment will it come under strict
scrutiny. 62
Employment Division v. Smith is a controversial opinion, in that it
(wrongly in my opinion) abandoned the use of the strict scrutiny test for
laws substantially burdening the free exercise of religion that had been
used in cases such as Sherbert v. Verner. 63 Congress almost immediately
58. Id.
59. See U.S. Const. amend. I (prohibiting the making a law “prohibiting the free exercise” of
religion).
60. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 889–90.
61. Compare Smith with Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. at 791 (subjecting content
neutral legislation to intermediate scrutiny); United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 376-77 (neutral
laws incidentally burdening speech get intermediate scrutiny).
62. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 534-35 (1993)
(finding law was not neutral when “almost the only conduct subject to ordinances was the religious
exercise of Santeria church members).
63. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). See Smith, 494 U.S. at 884-85.
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attempted to reinstate the use of the Sherbert strict scrutiny test by passing
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA). 64 However, the
Court ruled in City of Boerne v. Flores 65 that RFRA could not be applied
against state laws through the Fourteenth Amendment.
Twenty-one states, however, have passed their own versions of
RFRA. 66 Like the federal act, these state laws subject state legislation to
essentially the same strict scrutiny test that the Court used in Sherbert. 67
Therefore, any state legislation that “substantially burdens” the free
exercise of religion must be justified by a “compelling governmental
interest” and the legislation must be the “least restrictive means” of
furthering that interest. 68
It may fairly be questioned whether laws prohibiting a religious
gathering of more than a certain number of persons are in fact
“substantially burdening the free exercise of religion.” Such laws do not
prohibit religious gatherings per se, but rather simply impose a restriction
based on size. Moreover, in this day and age where churches are
broadcasting services over the internet, or having in-car services in
parking lots, it seems as though there are certainly options to worship that
would not involve in-person social gatherings. However, to the extent that
a person might be subjected to a criminal or civil penalty for attending a
religious gathering, both state laws 69 and Free Exercise jurisprudence 70
would hold such penalties to be a “substantial burden.”
Thus, such a burden would be evaluated under strict scrutiny. As
mentioned before, preventing the spread of virus in the midst of a
pandemic would certainly constitute a compelling governmental interest.
The question would be whether imposing the limit on religious gatherings
would be the least restrictive means to further that interest. This is an
extremely difficult burden to meet, as it requires the state to show that no
other feasible alternative would serve the purpose as well and be less
restrictive of rights. 71 Lower courts have generally interpreted this as
64. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (1993).
65. 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997).
66. National Conference of State Legislatures, State Religious Freedom Restoration Acts,
(May 4, 2017), https://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/state-rfra-statutes.aspx
[https://perma.cc/NYT3-EHYN].
67. See, e.g., Tex. Civ. Prac. & Remedies Code §110.001–110.012 (2015); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 60-5301(2013).
68. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-5303(a).
69. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-5302(a) (defining burden to include “assessing criminal,
civil or administrative penalties” for religious activity).
70. Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 720 (2004) (recognizing that subjecting a person to civil or
criminal penalties for religious activity would constitute a substantial burden).
71. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. 682, 728–32 (2014).
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requiring exemptions for religions where other comparable categories are
exempted. 72
In this case, however, it may be that state laws applying the person
gathering limit in fact meet this burden, so long as they are applying the
same burden on the number of persons that they apply for other similar
gatherings, such as concerts, demonstrations, recreational activity and the
like. It is difficult to conceive of another way in which the same benefits
of social distancing could be achieved to the same degree with less impact
on freedom of religion. Certainly, putting law enforcement officers in
churches to enforce social distancing requirements would not be less
restrictive, and trusting church members to practice social distancing on
their own would be less effective. Thus, this may be the rare case in which
the unique nature of the social distancing situation means that there is
simply no less restrictive means through which the state’s interest could
be achieved.
E.

Restrictions on Abortions

One other feature of the COVID-19 pandemic has been the attempt
by a number of states to use it as an opportunity to shut down abortions.
Six states—Arkansas, Alabama, Iowa, Ohio, Oklahoma, and Texas—
have attempted such bans by designating abortions as nonessential, and
citing the need to free up masks, gloves, and surgical equipment to meet

72. See Fraternal Order of Police Newark Lodge No. 12 v. City of Newark, 170 F.3d 359 (3d
Cir. 1999) (police department who permitted person to wear beards to avoid skin problems could not
forbid Muslim employees from wearing beards as required by their religion); Rader v. Johnston, 924
F. Supp. 1540 (D. Neb. 1996) (university could not force freshmen students to live in dorms rather
than a Christian residence when it allowed other freshman to live off campus).
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the virus. 73 While most of those have been overturned by courts,74 Texas’s
order survived in some respects. 75
The right to an abortion is governed by the “undue burden test”
established by the Court in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v.
Casey. 76 In Casey, the Court held that a state may not impose an “undue
burden” on the ability of a woman to obtain an abortion before viability. 77
The Court stated that “[u]nnecessary health regulations that have the
purpose or effect of presenting a substantial obstacle to a woman seeking
an abortion impose an undue burden on the right.” 78 In Whole Woman’s
Health v. Hellestadt, 79 the Court stated that, in order to determine whether
a regulation imposes an undue burden, a reviewing court must consider

73. See Hannah Gold & Claire Lampen, Every State That’s Tried to Ban Abortion Over The
Coronavirus, THE CUT (Apr. 14, 2020), https://www.thecut.com/2020/04/every-state-thats-tried-toban-abortion-over-coronavirus.html [https://perma.cc/NGM4-CE5D]; Molly Hennessy-Fiske,
Abortion during coronavirus: State bans, closed clinics, self-induced miscarriages, LOS ANGELES
TIMES (Apr. 16, 2020, 3:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2020-04-16/abortionduring-coronavirus-state-bans-canceled-appointments-travel [https://perma.cc/MAM5-SDWM].
74. On April 6, a federal district court granted a temporary restraining order against most of
Oklahoma’s restrictions S. Wind Women’s Ctr, LLC v. Stitt, No. CIV-20-277-G, 2020 WL 1677094
(W.D. Okla. Apr. 6, 2020). The restraining order prevented the enforcement of the prohibition on
surgical abortions with respect to any patient who will lose her right to lawfully obtain an abortion in
Oklahoma on or before the date of expiration of the Executive Order, and prevented the enforcement
of the prohibition on medication abortions in total. Id. On April 12, a preliminary injunction was
granted against Arkansas’s attempt. Robinson v. Marshall, No. 2:19CV365-MHT, 2020 WL 1847128
(M.D. Ala. Apr. 12, 2020). The decision allowed health care providers to determine whether an
abortion should be delayed. Id. Ohio’s ban was stayed, and the Sixth Circuit refused a request to
overturn the stay. Pre-term Cleveland v. Attorney Gen. of Ohio, No. 1:19-cv-00360 (S.D. Ohio Mar.
30, 2020), stay denied and appealed dismissed, No. 20-3365 (6th Cir. Apr. 6, 2020). Enforcement of
Arkansas’s order was similarly stayed. Little Rock Family Planning Services v. Rutledge, __ F. Supp.
3d __, 2020 WL 1862830 (E.D. Ark. Apr. 14, 2020).
75. See In re Abbott, No. 20-50264, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 1089 (5th Cir. Apr. 20, 2020)
Originally, the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas issued a temporary
restraining order barring enforcement of the governor’s executive order as applied to non-emergency
surgical and medication abortions. The Fifth Circuit granted mandamus reversing the temporary
restraining order. Id. The district court then issued a new temporary restraining order on April 10
which prevented the executive order from applying, until April 19, to three categories of abortion: (1)
medication abortions; (2) abortions for women who would be more than 18 weeks LMP (“last
menstrual period”) by April 22 and unable to reach an ambulatory surgical center; and (3) abortions
for women who would be past Texas’s legal limit—22 weeks LMP—for abortion by April 22. The
Fifth Circuit then granted a partial administrative stay of the temporary restraining order, except as to
the part applying to women who would be 22 weeks LMP by April 22. Finally, on April 13, the Fifth
Circuit dissolved the stay on the restraining order as applied to medication abortions. Id.
76. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
77. Id. at 878–79.
78. Id. at 878.
79. 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016).
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“the burdens a law imposes on abortion access together with the benefits
those laws confer.” 80
So far, the executive orders at issue have been ones that do not single
out abortion, but rather treat abortion as an “elective” surgery. 81 The
general reasons for postponing such surgeries are to limit face-to-face
contact, preserve the availability of personal protective equipment, and
conserve hospital beds, staff, and other resources. 82
Certainly, temporarily delaying elective surgeries does not generally
implicate constitutional rights. However, as with the Second Amendment
analysis of closing businesses, classifying abortion procedures as
“elective surgeries” causes a different degree of a problem. That is, it
completely removes the ability of the person affected to exercise her
constitutional right to an abortion for as long as the order remains in place.
Moreover, because of the nature of the right itself, a delay would in fact
eliminate the right, as the person affected will have passed the stage where
the right can be exercised. 83 Finally, because abortion can become more
dangerous later in the pregnancy, delay of the right increases the
possibility of complications, which have the potential to implicate more
medical resources. 84
In comparison, the benefits from delaying abortions are vanishingly
small. As the district court found in Robinson v. Marshall, the Alabama
decision, abortions are generally performed in outpatient procedures that
require very little protective gear, and rates of complications are low.85
The benefits of delay are even less pronounced in cases of “medication
abortions,” which require even fewer resources.86
The important thing to understand is that, unlike other procedures
that the state may deem to be “elective,” an abortion is actually a
recognized constitutional right. Under the circumstances, it seems highly
unlikely that the executive orders can withstand application of the
appropriate level of scrutiny. Therefore, they are likely to be held
unconstitutional.
80. Id. at 2309.
81. See, e.g. S. Wind Women’s Ctr. LLC v. Stitt, No. CIV-20-277-G, 2020 WL 1677094 at *2
(W.D. Okla. Apr. 6, 2020 (concerning Oklahoma’s order, which directs “Oklahomans and medical
providers in Oklahoma shall postpone all elective surgeries, minor medical procedures, and nonemergency dental procedures” until the expiration of the order).
82. See id.
83. See Robinson v. Marshall, No. 2:19CV365-MHT, 2020 WL 1847128 (M.D. Ala. Apr. 12,
2020).
84. See id.
85. See id. at 10–11.
86. See S. Wind Women’s Ctr. LLC v. Stitt, No. CIV-20-277-G, 2020 WL 1677094 at *5
(W.D. Okla. Apr. 6, 2020).
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CONCLUSION
These are interesting times. The COVID-19 crisis has shaken the
world, and mitigating its effects has required governmental action that
would have been almost unthinkable a few short months ago. During the
struggle to keep the population safe, it may seem that rights should take a
lesser place. However, it is during these times that rights are even more
important. The rights we possess do not fade away in an emergency, and
it is during an emergency that courts most need to enforce rights.
Fortunately, our constitutional system is already well-equipped to balance
rights and safety. A proper understanding of the framework involved is
vital to this endeavor.

